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ABSTRACT  
Harmonizing policies toward a specific State’s environmental policies or 
the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s economic policies can affect States’ 
rights to implement and enforce national environmental or economic poli-
cies. The State harmonization requirement, which restricts trade un-
less another State adopts a uniform environmental policy, has the po-
tential to infringe on another State’s right to determine and enforce its 
own environmental policy. One State’s right to take measures must be 
balanced with another State’s right to choose national policies under 
the state sovereignty principle of international law. Meanwhile, WTO 
harmonization, which requires compliance with obligations under 
WTO rules and the rulings of WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies 
(DSBs), considers diversity of States’ value preferences and the au-
thority of States to make their own policy choices. In this context, the 
WTO requires a balance between a State’s desire to avoid distortion 
in international competition and another State’s right to enforce envi-
ronmental policies. In sum, in modern state sovereignty principle, a 
State is more influenced by other States’ actions or international insti-
tutions’ activities because of increased interdependence. Accordingly, 
both the State and WTO harmonization requirements must be imple-
mented in a way that protects States’ rights of environmental policy 
choice and enforcement.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Environmental problems cannot be resolved “in isolation” because 
environmental considerations are intertwined with social and cultural values 
and economic development.1 A nation’s environmental regulations and 
policies may differ from other countries’ policies on the basis of that 
nation’s pollution level, technical and economic capacity, and value 
preference.2 Thus, environmental problems are dealt with more efficiently 
  
 1. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (7th ed. 2008).  
 2. DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 
157 (1994). Cf. John H. Jackson, Comments on Initial Draft of Chapter, in ANALYTICAL AND 
NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 599, 600 (Alan V. Deardorff & 
Robert M. Stern eds., 1994)(discussing techniques for managing interdependence) 
[hereinafter Jackson 1994]; Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. (OECD), Environmental 
Standards: Definitions and the Need for International Harmonization ¶¶ 6, 9, 21-27 (1974) 
[hereinafter OECD 1974]; David Robertson, Trade and the Environment: Harmonization and 
Technical Standards, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 309, 312 (Patrick 
Low ed., 1992). 
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within a state’s own policy objectives.3 International relations require these 
value preferences to be respected within each country due to the principle of 
state sovereignty.4 
Harmonizing environmental policies toward a specific set of domestic 
environmental policies or international rules would be contrary to the 
principle of state sovereignty. When a State exercises its right unilaterally to 
coerce another State to adopt uniform environmental policies, one State’s 
right can constrain another State’s right to implement and enforce its own 
environmental policies.5 This State harmonization requirement can threaten 
the other State’s sovereignty. The State harmonization requirement can also 
conflict with the World Trade Organization (WTO) harmonization 
requirement, which tries to balance rights between States. The State 
harmonization requirement needs to balance a State’s right to implement 
and enforce environmental policies and obligation to respect other States’ 
rights.  
Harmonizing regulations toward WTO rules can also hurt States’ 
sovereign rights to determine and enforce their environmental policies. The 
WTO requires a Member State to abide by WTO obligations6 and to 
implement the ruling of the WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies (DSBs) when 
it is a party to the dispute.7 This WTO harmonization requirement is 
criticized for overwhelming its Member States’ sovereignty over their 
domestic economic or environmental policies.8 WTO harmonization 
requires a State to balance its own rights and its obligations under the WTO.  
The State sovereignty principle grants a State absolute discretion over its 
implementation of policies within its jurisdiction.9 Thus, when a State’s 
  
 3. Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and Environment: The False Conflict, in TRADE AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 159, 165 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 
1993) [hereinafter Bhagwati 1993].  
 4. Brownlie, supra note 1, at 289.  
 5. Daniel Bodansky & Jessica C. Lawrence, Trade and Environment, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 505, 522 (2009).  
 6. Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures against 
Foreign Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES 
FOR FREE TRADE? LEGAL ANALYSIS 95, 116-17 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 
1996) [hereinafter Hudec 1996b]; Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 7.26, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp 
Panel Report]. 
 7. See Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are 
Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 341 (2000); John H. 
Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstanding on the Nature of 
Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 60, 60 (1997) [hereinafter Jackson 1997a]; DAN 
SAROOSHI, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THEIR EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS 96-
97 (2005). 
 8. See Steve Charnovitz, Competitivenes, Harmonization, and the Global 
Ecolonomy, in AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: DISCOVERING AND 
MEASURING THE CRITICAL LINKAGES 47, 56 (Maury E. Bredahl et al. ed., 1996). 
 9. Frederick A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 1 
RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1964); Brownlie, supra note 1, at 289.  
464 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:2  
environmental policies are significantly challenged by another State’s policy 
requirement or a WTO institutional requirement, it is critical for the State to 
argue for respect its sovereignty. Both the State and WTO harmonization 
requirements can affect States’ rights to implement and enforce national 
environmental policies. The State harmonization requirement would justify 
a State’s intervening in other States’ sovereign rights based on the common 
concern of environmental protection;10 the WTO harmonization requirement 
requires Member States to introduce a homogenized trading system, and 
conform their domestic economic policies to WTO rules.11 
Neither the State nor WTO harmonization necessarily implies explicit 
harmonization in international trade. A State does not necessarily enact 
explicit harmonization requirement under its legislation. Mostly, a State’s 
regulations do not require foreign producers to adopt the same 
environmental policies, but a State can take trade measures when its trading 
partner does not meet requirements under its environmental policies or 
regulations. The State’s trade measures on the basis of environmental 
policies can result in the same economic effects as the harmonization 
requirement. In this context, the State’s trade measures are led by not direct 
or de jure harmonization, but rather by an indirect or de facto harmonization 
requirement.12 Further, this State harmonization requirement will only work 
“if a country requiring harmonization has a large market” that is big enough 
to influence the export of other countries.13 Thus, throughout this paper, the 
State harmonization discussion largely refers to the de facto harmonization 
requirement, but also includes the de jure one as a possibility.  
Similarly, the WTO does not require its Member States to adopt 
explicitly the same economic policies and laws.14 WTO rules do not cover 
Member States’ harmonization of regulations or standards, but rather 
provides Member States with a framework for economic policies and rules 
in international trade.15 What the WTO requires its Member States to do is 
to implement their national economic policies and law in accordance with 
their commitments and obligations under the WTO. Accordingly, 
throughout this paper, WTO harmonization implies that the WTO Member 
States implement their economic policies and laws to comply with their 
concessions or commitment under the WTO.  
  
 10. See Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable 
Development: A commentary, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 728, 732 (1992). 
 11. David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization 
Claims, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?: ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 41, 41 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996); Robertson, supra 
note 2, at 312. 
 12. Interview with Padideh Ala’i, Professor, American University Washington 
College of Law, in Washington D.C. (Jun. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Ala’i interview]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Robertson, supra note 2, at 310-11. 
 15. Jackson 1994, supra note 2, at 600; Ala’i Interview, supra note 12. 
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This paper discusses these two different scenarios of when and how the 
State or the WTO harmonization requirement affects a State’s sovereignty 
to implement and enforce its own domestic environmental policies. This 
paper is organized as follows: section two discusses the principle of state 
sovereignty in international law; section three examines a State’s unilateral 
action affecting other States’ sovereign right to legislate and enforce its 
environmental policies and laws; and, section four analyzes the WTO 
harmonization requirement and States’ sovereign right to make 
environmental policies.  
1. THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
Sovereignty is a State’s “internal power or constitutional capacity.”16 
State Sovereignty represents three aspects: exclusive jurisdiction, state 
equality, and non-intervention.17 A State has “absolute power over its 
subjects,” for example, its population and territory internally.18 Sovereignty 
grants States equality in international relations so a State is not constrained by 
any other higher powers.19 Thus, no State can intervene in the area of another 
States’ sovereignty.20 However, this traditional concept of state sovereignty is 
not entirely acceptable in modern international relations. The absolute 
character of sovereignty is challenged in certain circumstances related to 
human rights violations, war crime or terrorism.21 Therefore, States or 
international organizations can justify intervention into the sovereign 
territory of another State on the ground of resolving global concerns.  
Globalization has also helped change the traditional doctrine of exclusive 
state sovereignty22 because it has increased political, legal, and economic 
  
 16. See Mann, supra note 9, at 9. See also Brownlie, supra note 1, at 289. 
 17. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty: Outdated Concept or New Approaches, in 
REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 3, 4 (Wenshua Shan et al. eds., 
2008) [hereinafter Jackson 2008]. See also Vaughan Lowe, Sovereignty and International 
Economic Law, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 77, 83 
(Wenshua Shan et al. eds., 2008); BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 289. 
 18. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 289. See also Jackson 2008, supra note 17, at 11; 
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW 
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 369 (2000) [hereinafter JACKSON 2000]. 
Original one: John Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance 
and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND 
THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 367, 369 (2000) 
[hereinafter Jackson 2000]. 
 19. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 289; Jackson 2008, supra note 17, at 4, 11.  
 20. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 289; Jackson 2008, supra note 17, at 4; c.f. 
Lowe, supra note 17, at 83 (generally discussing limits of sovereignty). 
 21. See Jackson 2008, supra note 17, at 13, 20; Lowe, supra note 17, at 80. 
 22. See Jackson 2008, supra note 17, at 6-10. See generally JACKSON 2000, supra 
note 18. See also Lowe, supra note 17; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, State Sovereignty, Popular 
Sovereignty, and Individual Sovereignty: From Constitutional Nationalism to Multilevel 
Constitutionalism in International Economic Law?, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY IN 
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limitations.23 Greater interdependence through globalization increases the 
influence by other States’ actions and the obligations of international 
institutions.24 International institutions may play an important role in 
coordinating international matters, which are difficult for a nation-state to 
resolve on its own.25 This international interdependence engenders tension 
between traditional state sovereignty and the international regime.26  
A State’s economic regulatory decisions can come into conflict with the 
mechanisms for international cooperation when a State’s national policies 
do not comply with its obligations under the international institutions.27 For 
a State to cooperate in international relations, it must concede some of its 
state sovereignty.28 For example, States consent to be bound by international 
legal constraints that arise out of treaties.29 As such, accepting any treaty 
reduces a national government’s freedom of action because some actions may 
be inconsistent with the treaty and, thus would be a violation of international 
law.30 WTO Member States’ rights also are constrained because they gave 
up some of their sovereignty by conferring their rights to the WTO to 
achieve important policy results.31  
However, these modern aspects of sovereignty do not necessarily prevail 
over States’ sovereign rights. A State’s obligations under international law 
must be recognized to the extent that the State consents.32 An international 
organization must exercise its power in a way that is based on each State’s 
sovereign values because the meaning of sovereignty differs in different 
States.33 When an intervention overwhelms State sovereignty to address 
issues of the global commons, it must be exercised only under international 
  
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 27, 28 (Wenshua Shan et al. eds., 2008); Michael W. 
Dunleavy, The Limits of Free Trade: Sovereignty, Environmental Protection, and NAFTA, in 
NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT 265 (Seymour J. Rubin & Dean C. Alexander eds., 1996). 
 23. Petersmann, supra note 22, at 28. The author defines sovereignty from the human 
rights perspective. According to the author, modern sovereignty reallocates power from the 
government to individuals or people. Respect for individuals includes diversity and 
regulatory competition in international trade. From the perspective of human rights, the free 
trade system must be supported because the sovereignty to engage in free trade can help 
ensure human rights. The GATT and the WTO are based on the liberalization and regulation 
of welfare-reducing trade barriers, and thus the WTO is the mechanism through which 
individuals can gain sovereign rights. Id. at 28-32. See also W. Michael Reisman, 
Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT AND H. 
866 (1990).  
 24. Jackson 2008, supra note 17, at 10.  
 25. Id. at 6.  
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 22; Dunleavy, supra note 22, at 265. 
 28. Dunleavy, supra note 22, at 271. 
 29. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 289; Jackson 2008, supra note 17, at 
11; JACKSON 2000, supra note 18, at 369. 
 30. JACKSON 2000, supra note 18, at 380. 
 31. Id. at 379. 
 32. Jackson 2008, supra note 17, at 19. 
 33. Sarooshi, supra note 7, at 9-11. 
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law principles. The following sections discuss whether a State’s sovereign 
right is constrained by the unilateral action of another State and the 
obligations of international law.  
2. A STATE’S UNILATERAL ACTION AFFECTING OTHER STATES’ 
SOVEREIGNTY  
2.1. A State’s Unilateral Action Affecting Other States’ Sovereignty to 
Enforce Environmental Policies  
A State’s unilateral action based on its domestic environmental policies 
or its international obligations under Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs) can constrain other States’ sovereign rights. A State 
has right to implement its policies and to impose trade restrictions to 
achieve both its domestic environmental goals34 and the goals it has taken 
collectively through MEAs.35 However, a State’s authority to enforce its 
environmental policies is limited in international relations when its 
exercising authority is a unilateral action affecting the sovereign rights of 
other States. A State’s unilateral action constrains other States’ sovereign 
rights to regulate and implement their environmental policies when it puts 
pressure on others to make their national policies more uniform.36 This 
unilateral constraint results in a State’s intervening in the environmental 
policies of other States by using economic rules.37 A State’s intervening 
national policies go against the sovereignty principle of international law – 
that a State’s domestic problems should be solved within its own 
  
 34. See Edith Brown Weiss & John H. Jackson, The Framework for Environment 
and Trade Disputes, in RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 1, 27 (Edith Brown Weiss et 
al. eds., 2nd ed. 2008). See also Shinya Murase, Unilateral Measures and the Concept of 
Opposability in International Law, in 28 MIGHT AND RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
397, 405, 453 (Kalliopi Koufa ed., 1999) [hereinafter Murase 1999]. 
 35. See GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment 10-11, GATT/ 1529 (Feb. 3, 
1992) [hereinafter GATT Report 1992]. See also Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of 
Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin 
Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L EVNTL. L. REV. 1, 100-107, 112, 122 (1999); TIM LANG & COLIN 
HINES, THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: PROTECTING THE FUTURE AGAINST FREE TRADE 66 (1993); 
Esty, supra note 2, at 19-20, 144, 150. 
 36. Bodansky & Lawrence, supra note 5, at 522.  
 37. When a State affects other States’ domestic environmental policies, such action 
can be considered eco-imperialism. Weiss, supra note 10, at 732. Eco-imperialism is defined 
as instances “when the strong nations use trade power to force their preferred values on the 
weaker nations but the equally autonomous values of the weaker nations cannot be forced upon 
the stronger nations” in the same way. Id. See also Jagdish Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, Trade 
and the Environment: Does Environmental Diversity Detract from the Case for Free Trade?, 
in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 159, 181 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec 
eds., 1996; Bhagwati 1993, supra note 3, at 171. 
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jurisdiction. States and international institutions must “refrain from 
intervening in the internal or external affairs of other states.”38  
Therefore, when a State’s unilateral measure potentially infringes on 
another State’s sovereignty, a balance must exist between a State’s right to 
take measures and another State’s right to implement its own environmental 
policies. Here, three different types of balance between States can be 
considered: first, balance between States’ rights to implement their domestic 
policies; second, balance between a State’s common concern for 
environmental conservation and another State’s discretion to choose its own 
policy; and, third, balance between a State’s right to take environmental 
measures and its obligation to respect other States’ rights under the WTO.  
First, the State harmonization requirement to compel another State to 
adopt uniform environmental policies must consider the balance between 
States making their own choices to shape their environmental policies. 
Under international law and in the WTO, a State is not permitted to take 
unilateral action to coerce other States to make their domestic policies 
uniform with its policies, for this can hinder their rights to implement their 
environmental policies. Thus, balance is required when a State’s policy 
choice affects another State’s policy. Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development (hereinafter Rio Declaration) 
provides that each State has the sovereign right to choose its own 
environmental policies on the basis of its national need.39  
WTO decisions have ruled against a State’s unilateral measures when it 
affects another State’s right to make policy choices. The Panel of United 
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (hereinafter US-Tuna), where the 
U.S. prohibited the import of tuna from Mexico and EEC, which was 
harvested in a way that adversely affected dolphin. It was noted that a 
State’s unilateral measures based on the environmental exceptions provided 
by Articles XX(b) and XX(g) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994 (GATT 1994)40 can “jeopardize [other States’] rights” under the General 
  
 38. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 292. 
 39. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, 
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. In 
addition, States have to consider its obligation not to damage the environment of other States. 
Principle 2 says that “[s]tates have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental and development policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Id. 
 40. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) consists of the 
provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. Thus, the GATT 1994 
means same as the GATT 1947. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ¶ 1(a), 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 190 [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).41 The Appellate Body in United 
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
(hereinafter US-Shrimp), in which the U.S. banned the import of shrimp 
harvested in a way that adversely affected sea turtles, recognized that the 
1996 Guidelines and certification requirements under Section 609 prevented 
other countries from executing and implementing their own domestic 
policies.42  
Meanwhile, in international trade, some constraints exist that relate to the 
rights of trading countries because the exporting country must meet the 
requirements of the importing country to access the importing country’s 
market.43 Constraints exist both in one State’s taking coercive unilateral 
measures and in another State’s accessing the market. In this context, the 
statement of the Panel in United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products -Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia (hereinafter US-
Shrimp (21.5)) is controversial. It noted that, for Malaysia to export shrimp to 
the United States, it is acceptable to distort Malaysia’s environmental policy 
priorities to meet the policy requirements of the United States.44 This 
statement seems to imply that a certain level of constraint on the exporting 
State’s policy priority is acceptable in order to respect the importing State’s 
autonomy to implement its environmental or economic policies. However, 
the Panel’s choice to use the term “distort” was not appropriate in terms of a 
State’s national policy priorities or sovereign right. Accordingly, to create a 
balance between States’ policy choices, a State must respect another States’ 
autonomy and right to determine and implement their national 
environmental policies under international law and the WTO.  
Second, one State’s measures to implement common concern on 
environmental conservation should balance with another State’s discretion 
to make its own policy choice. Trade measures can be allowed when 
international agreements use economic sanctions to enforce their provisions, 
preventing transboundary environmental harm.45 State’s measures are also 
  
 41. Panel Report, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶¶ 5.27, 5.32, 
DS21/R -39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991) (unadopted), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) (1992) 
[hereinafter US-Tuna (Mexico)]; Panel Report, United States - Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, ¶ 5.26, DS29/R (Jun. 16, 1994) (unadopted ) [hereinafter US-Tuna (EEC)].  
 42. Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 161, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp Appellate 
Body Report]. 
 43. Id. ¶ 121; Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products -Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 138, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter US-Shrimp (21.5) Appellate Body Report].  
 44. Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products -Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, ¶ 5.103, WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001) 
[hereinafter US-Shrimp (21.5) Panel Report]. 
 45. Esty, supra note 2, at. 19-20, 144, 150. See also GATT Secretariat, Industrial 
Pollution Control and International Trade 4, L/3538 (June 9, 1971) [hereinafter GATT 
Report 1971].  
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permitted when there is no international agreement to address the problem, 
or when no alternative exists to achieve national environmental policy 
objectives. 46 However, the notion that the protection of the environment is a 
common concern as a whole can weaken a nation-state’s autonomy over its 
conventional jurisdiction.47 International obligations under MEAs do not 
necessarily authorize a State the legal justification to take unilateral 
measures.48 There needs to be a balance between a State’s common concern 
for the environmental protection and another State’s discretion of policy 
choice. Rio Principle 12 finds a balance by encouraging States to rely on 
international consensus when taking environmental measures to deal with 
transboundary or global environmental problems.49 Thus, balance between a 
State’s common concern and another’s discretion lies in creating 
international cooperation related to environmental conservation for areas of 
common concern.  
Third, a State’s rights are constrained to the extent necessary to, one, 
ensure its obligation to respect other States’ rights in the WTO and, two, not 
excessively exercise discretion in a way that affects other States’ rights to 
market access in international trade. The WTO encourages its Member 
States both to exercise their own right to take environmental protection 
measures and to respect other States’ rights under the WTO. The US-Shrimp 
Appellate Body confirmed this by ruling that the introductory paragraph of 
Article XX of the GATT 1994 (Chapeau of GATT Article XX)50 shows that 
  
 46. PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 777-78 
(3rd ed. 2009); ESTY, supra note 2, at 144, 237; LANG & HINES, supra note 35, at 65-66; 
Weiss & Jackson, supra note 34, at 28-29; Murase 1999, supra note 34, at 424, 430; Ilona 
Cheyne, Environmental Unilateralism and the WTO/GATT System, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 433, 461 (1995).  
 47. Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity Among Trading 
Nations, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 9, 10-11 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. 
Hudec eds., 1996). Some argue that unilateral measures “outside . . . national jurisdiction” to 
protect the global commons should be acceptable because enforcement of protection of the 
global commons is recognized as a nation’s obligation under customary international law. 
Weiss, supra note 10, at 731-33. However, under international law, it is not established yet 
whether environmental protection is an international responsibility or whether global 
environmental damage is considered an international crime. 
 48. Hudec 1996, supra note 6, at 157. 
 49. Rio Declaration, supra note 39, principle 12 (“States should cooperate to 
promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic 
growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of 
environmental degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the 
jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing 
transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an 
international consensus.”). 
 50. Article XX of the GATT 1994 provides exceptions to general obligations of the 
GATT and WTO so that WTO Member States can take measures necessary to or relating to 
environmental protection. To justify trade measures, a Member State must meet both each 
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WTO Members recognize “the need to maintain a balance of rights and 
obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or another of the 
exceptions of Article XX . . . and the substantive rights of the other 
Members under the GATT 1994.”51 States’ environmental policy goals are 
legitimate when they respect other Members’ rights under the WTO.  
Meanwhile, a State’s excessive exercise of its rights will not be allowed 
in the WTO because it can threaten other Member States’ rights to trade 
freely. Allowing States to enact national environmental policies under the 
concept of state sovereignty can, in fact, give a State a way to disguise trade 
protectionism by claiming a legitimate environmental protection goal.52 
National governments’ decisions should be given considerable deference, 
but that deference should not be absolute.53 When a country is granted the 
absolute discretion to determine its environmental policies, it can abuse this 
power by using its policies to justify trade protectionism.54 A State’s 
excessive exercise of its rights will not be allowed in the WTO because it 
can threaten other member states’ right to trade freely. The WTO Panels and 
Appellate Bodies have found it necessary to limit Member States’ abuse of 
national environmental policies.55 The US-Shrimp Appellate Body noted 
that prohibiting a State’s abuse of its rights is a general principle of 
international law.56 Accordingly, the WTO requires its Member States to 
balance a State’s discretion to take environmental measures with another 
State’s right to access the global market.  
In sum, in international relations, a State has the right to implement its 
environmental policies and to take measures to enforce them. However, this 
  
relevant provisional requirement under GATT Article XX and the requirements under the 
introductory paragraph of GATT Article XX (the Chapeau of Article XX). See US-Tuna 
(Mexico), supra note 41, ¶¶ 5.27, 5.32; US-Tuna (EEC), supra note 41, ¶¶ 5.12, 5.29; Report 
of the Panel, United States-Taxes on Automobiles, ¶ 5.56, DS31/R (Oct. 11, 1994) 
(unadopted) [hereinafter US-Automobiles]; Panel Report, United States- Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶¶ 6.20, 6.31, 6.35, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) 
[hereinafter US Gasoline Panel Report]; Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 22, WT/DS2/AB/R 19 (Apr. 29, 1996) 
[hereinafter US-Gasoline Appellate Body Report];US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra 
note 42, ¶ 118; US-Shrimp (21.5) Panel Report, supra note 44, ¶ 5.28; Panel Report, Brazil-
Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶¶ 7.37-7.38, WT/DS332/R (June 12, 2007) 
[hereinafter Brazil-Tyres Panel Report].  
 51. See US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 42, ¶¶ 156-59. See also US-
Shrimp (21.5) Panel Report, supra note 44, ¶¶ 5.50, 5.51; Appellate Body Report, Brazil-
Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 224, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) 
[hereinafter Brazil-Tyres Appellate Body Report]. 
 52. ESTY, supra note 2, at 57; Dunleavy, supra note 22, at 272. 
 53. ESTY, supra note 2, at 58. 
 54. Id. at 57-58. 
 55. See US-Tuna (Mexico), supra note 41, ¶ 6.2. See also US Gasoline Panel Report, 
supra note 50, ¶ 7.1; US-Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 50, at 30; US-Shrimp 
Panel Report, supra note 6, ¶¶ 6.6, 7.45, 7.55, 9.1; US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra 
note 42, ¶ 186; Brazil-Tyres Appellate Body Report, supra note 51, ¶ 210. 
 56. US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 42, ¶ 158.  
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unilateral action is limited to the extent necessary for other States to 
exercise their rights. A State’s right to take measures on the basis of 
environmental policy must be balanced with the other States’ autonomy to 
make environmental or economic policy choices.  
2.2. A State’s Unilateral Measures Acting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for 
Environmental Protection  
States have jurisdiction, which is “the general legal competence of States 
such as judicial, legislative, and administrative competence within its 
territory.”57 A State has the authority to regulate and to enforce those 
regulations within its territory.58 When a State’s law binds the sovereignty of 
other States, the exercise of law is an “excess of jurisdiction” or extra-
jurisdiction.59  
Jurisdiction is based on the principle of territoriality, which means every 
State possesses exclusive authority over its nationals within its territory.60 
One of the fundamental principles of international law is that a nation’s 
public law can only be applied and enforced in its territory and that any 
extraterritorial extension of sovereign power is unjustified.61 Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction has “significant harmful effects within the territory that asserts 
jurisdiction.”62 A State cannot take measures or enforce national laws in the 
territory of another State unless that State consents63 because a State’s 
extraterritorial action can limit the jurisdiction or sovereign rights of other 
States.64 A State can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction only when “its 
  
 57. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 299; see also MANN, supra note 9, at 30; see 
generally Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 
(Apr. 5) (recognizing that jurisdiction is one of the most obvious forms of the exercise of 
sovereign power). 
 58. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 299; see also MANN, supra note 9, at 9-15. See 
MANN, supra note 9, at 9 (distinguishing international jurisdiction from domestic jurisdiction 
of internal power, constitutional capacity or sovereignty). 
 59. See MANN, supra note 9, at 12, at 24-28.  
 60. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 299; see also MANN, supra note 9, at 24-40.  
 61. Shinya Murase, Perspectives from International Economic Law on Transnational 
Environmental Issues, 253 RECUEIL DES COURS 283, 349 (1995) [hereinafter Murase 1995]. 
 62. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE 
USE IT 74 (1994). 
 63. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 299, 309.  
 64. Peter L. Lallas et al., Daniel C. Esty & David J. van Hoogstraten, Environmental 
Protection and International Trade: Toward Mutually Supportive Rules and Policies, 16 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 271, 340 (1992). Extra-territorial jurisdiction includes nationality, 
protective, passive-personality, and universal jurisdiction. The nationality principle grants a 
State the jurisdiction over its nationals within its territory and abroad. The passive-
personality principle grants a State the jurisdiction over its national outside territory when its 
nationals are harmed. The protective principle grants a State the jurisdiction outside territory 
for its security. Universal jurisdiction grants a State the jurisdiction outside its territory or 
over non-nationals for international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, piracy, or slavery. 
See HIGGINS, supra note 62, at 56-65, 73-74; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 300-307. 
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exercise is not excessive and it does not attempt to enforce its jurisdiction 
within the territory of another State.”65 It is unacceptable for a State to 
enforce its laws upon its nationals when they are in another State’s 
territory.66  
Extraterritorial jurisdiction will be legitimate in certain circumstances, 
including three principles: one, the non-intervention principle, second, the 
proportionality principle, and third, the substantial link.67 First, a State’s 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction must not intervene with other States’ 
jurisdiction. As interdependence between States increases, the absolute 
application of the principle of territorial jurisdiction becomes difficult.68 
Even though a State cannot enforce its jurisdiction outside its territory, a 
State may be able to create legal norms, which effectively control conduct 
outside its territory.69 In this instance, a State’s extraterritorial exercise of 
jurisdiction is legitimate only when it does not intervene with the 
jurisdiction of other States under established international law.70 Second, a 
State’s extraterritorial jurisdictional measure must be mutual and 
proportionate with the other States’ breach of international law.71 Third, to 
apply extraterritorial jurisdiction, a State must demonstrate that its exercise 
of jurisdiction is substantially linked to the subject matter.72 In the US-Tuna 
case, there was no “direct link” between “the act of incidental killing of 
dolphins” and “the act of importing tuna into the United States.”73 The 
Panel ruled against the United States’ import restriction because of the lack 
of a direct link between the “protection of dolphins and import restriction of 
tuna.”74 Accordingly, a State should consider these three principles when it 
exercises jurisdiction extraterritorially.  
A State’s unilateral action is not allowed under the established 
international law and the WTO when such action affects areas outside a 
State’s jurisdiction.75 Extraterritorial jurisdiction is distinguished from extra-
jurisdiction.76 Extra-jurisdiction is when a state acts in excess of its own 
jurisdiction.77 It is a fundamental principle of international law that a State 
cannot exercise jurisdiction over nationals and territory with which it “has 
  
 65. HIGGINS, supra note 62, at 73. 
 66. Id. 
 67. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 311-12. 
 68. MANN, supra note 9, at 36-40. 
 69. MURASE 1995, supra note 61, at 351. 
 70. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 311-12. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 352-54; MANN, supra note 9, at 43-51. 
 73. MURASE 1995, supra note 61, at 353. 
 74. Id. at 354. 
 75. Bhagwati & Srinivasan, supra note 37, at 179. 
 76. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 46, at 771. 
 77. Mann, supra note 9, at 37, 43-51. 
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no absolute concern.”78 Meanwhile, extraterritorial jurisdiction implies that 
a country exercises its jurisdiction outside its territory.79 The US-Tuna 
(EEC) Panel distinguished extraterritorial jurisdiction from extra-
jurisdiction. While the US-Tuna (Mexico) Panel used the term of “extra-
jurisdiction,” the US-Tuna (EEC) Panel introduced the term “extra-
territorial jurisdiction” regarding environmental conservation.80 The US-
Tuna (Mexico) Panel rejected the parties’ extra-jurisdictional application of 
GATT Articles XX(b) and XX(g) to protect the environment on the basis 
that natural resources were only “within the jurisdiction of the importing 
country under GATT Articles XX(b) and XX(g).”81  
GATT Article XX has been interpreted to allow conditionally national 
measures when they are for the protection of extraterritorial resources.82 
GATT/WTO decisions recognized the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
to protect the environment in certain circumstances. The Panel in US-Tuna 
(EEC) and the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp recognized that certain 
circumstances warrant States using extraterritorial jurisdiction to protect and 
conserve natural resources under GATT Article XX.83 The US-Tuna (EEC) 
Panel noted that “the text of Article XX(g) does not spell out any limitation 
on the location of the exhaustible natural resource to be reserved [under 
Article XX(g) and of the living thing to be protected under Article 
XX(b).]”84 There, the Panel found that States could regulate only the 
conduct of their own nationals and vessels outside of their territory to 
conserve the living things and the exhaustible natural resources under 
Article XX(b) and XX(g).85 The Appellate Body in US-Shrimp noted that 
“there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory species and … the United 
States [jurisdiction] for the purpose of Article XX(g).”86 The Appellate 
Body recognized this nexus only in “specific circumstances,” - the fact that 
sea turtles can freely “pass in and out of waters subject to the rights of 
  
 78. The Trustees Executors and Agency Co. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (1933) 49 CLR 220, 239 (Austl.). 
 79. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 299-311. 
 80. US-Tuna (Mexico), supra note 41, ¶¶ 5.25-5.32; US-Tuna (EEC), supra note 41, 
¶¶ 5.15-5.33. 
 81. US-Tuna (Mexico), supra note 41, ¶¶ 5.26, 5.31-.32. The Panel ruled that, since a 
country can only control production or consumption within its jurisdiction, a trade measure 
would have to be taken within its jurisdiction under Article XX(g). Id. ¶ 5.31. See also Cheyne, 
supra note 46, at 452-53.  
 82. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 46, at 771. 
 83. US-Tuna (EEC), supra note 41, ¶¶ 5.15, .20, .31-.33; US-Shrimp Appellate Body 
Report, supra note 42, ¶ 133. 
 84. US-Tuna (EEC), supra note 41, ¶¶ 5.15, .20, .31-.33. 
 85. Id. ¶¶ 5.17-.20, .33. This decision “is based on the active personality jurisdiction 
under which a State may control the activities of its own citizens.” Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 
International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for 
Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 280 (1997); Cheyne, supra note 46, at 455. 
 86. US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 42, ¶ 133. 
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jurisdiction of various coastal States.”87 Thus, GATT Article XX can permit 
a State’s extraterritorial measure when a sufficient link exists between 
environmental measures and a State’s policy objective.  
These cases conditionally recognized that GATT Articles XX(b) and 
XX(g) allow for national measures designed to protect resources using 
extraterritorial jurisdictions, but not measures that are extra-jurisdictional.88 
However, the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction is limited. When a 
country decides to apply its domestic law extraterritorially, it is a unilateral 
decision made by that country, not a decision made with international 
agreements.89 In these instances, extraterritorial application may involve a 
government’s unilateral action that goes against a foreign government’s 
different policy objective.90  
In summary, within its own jurisdiction, a State is free to enact 
environmental regulations and enforce those regulations related to both 
domestic and global concerns. However, a State cannot exercise power 
beyond its jurisdiction. In addition, because the theory of state sovereignty 
is based on territoriality, a State cannot regulate and implement its domestic 
environmental policies outside its territory except in certain instances. 
Under international law and the international trade system, a State’s 
unilateral action taken outside of its jurisdiction is limited to instances 
where a substantial link exists between trade measures and an 
environmental policy objective.  
3. THE WTO HARMONIZATION REQUIREMENT AND A STATE’S 
SOVEREIGNTY  
This section examines how WTO harmonization affects state sovereignty 
by looking at relationship between the WTO harmonization requirement and a 
States’ diversity in value preferences and between a State’s obligations and 
rights under the WTO.  
3.1. The WTO’s Harmonization and a State’s Diversity of 
Environmental Policies  
The WTO harmonization requirement is meaningful when it reaches 
reconciliation with national economic policy choices. The WTO strives to 
expand the harmonized international trading mechanism, which improves 
economic development through the reduction of tariffs and trade barriers, and 
  
 87. Id. 
 88. Cheyne, supra note 46, at 453; Schoenbaum, supra note 85, at 280.  
 89. Murase 1999, supra note 34, at 437. 
 90. Id. 
476 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:2  
elimination of discriminatory treatment.91 For States to harmonize toward 
international rule and to eliminate policy differences across borders, they 
must make concessions related to their sovereignty.92 Further, requiring a 
State to accept internationally harmonized economic rules can preclude it 
from determining internally optimal economic policies.93 National economic 
policies clash with international economic regulations when national value 
policy preferences disfavor foreign products.94 Thus, the WTO 
harmonization requirement needs to be reconciled with State’s national 
policy choices, which are based on diversity in each country.  
A uniform legal system between States can be attained by accepting an 
internationally harmonized system or by introducing the legal system of 
other States. On the one hand, international instruments can provide States 
with an internationally harmonized system. On the other hand, the State’s 
previously introduced legal system can serve as a model for other States’ 
legal systems, which would also result in uniform or similar legal systems 
or policies. A uniform legal system or policy, thus, can reflect a State’s 
willingness to accept previously successful legal systems or policies. 
However, implementing a uniform legal system and policies in each State 
will not necessarily be exactly the same because changes can occur in the 
process of a State accepting and incorporating either international or another 
State’s legal system or policies into its domestic ones. Every country has its 
own specific social, cultural, religious, political, and economic priorities.95 
Thus, any uniform international system must recognize there will be a large 
degree of diversity due to cultural differences, historical backgrounds, 
government systems or economic attainment and needs to adjust 
accordingly.96  
In the WTO’s international economic mechanism, it can be controversial 
to have different treatment on the basis of different value preferences.97 In this 
context, the WTO can be criticized for being a homogenizing force on 
culture and community.98 In Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of 
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (hereinafter Canada-Herring and 
Salmon), the Canadian policy regulating exports of unprocessed salmon and 
  
 91. GATT 1994, supra note 40, preamble; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, Annex 1A [hereinafter WTO 
Establishing Agreement]. 
 92. Dunleavy, supra note 22, at 268-69. 
 93. Leebron, supra note 11, at 65; Dunleavy, supra note 22, at 269. 
 94. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 539 (5th ed. 2008). 
 95. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 56 (1969) [hereinafter 
Jackson 1969]. 
 96. Jackson 1994, supra note 2, at 600. 
 97. John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or 
Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1243 (1992). 
 98. Charnovitz, supra note 8, at 56. 
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herring was called into question. This policy was implemented to continue 
Canada’s longstanding fishery resource preservation and management 
program, which had existed in Canada’s west coast since 1908.99 In its 
defense, Canada noted that each country could have “different national 
priorities on fisheries.”100 The Panel recognized “the harvest limitations 
‘restrictions on domestic production’ [as measures] within the meaning of 
Article XX(g)”, but ruled against Canada because Canada could preserve 
fisheries without imposing export prohibitions on them.101 Similary, in 
Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes 
(hereinafter Thailand-Cigarettes), the Thailand Tobacco Act, which was 
implemented in 1938, was declared inconsistent with the GATT rules.102 In 
both Canada-Herring and Salmon and Thailand-Cigarettes, long-standing 
policies were declared incompatible with the GATT/WTO. These diverse 
priorities in national policies raise a question about the extent to which the 
WTO requires its member states to alter value preferences in social, cultural, 
political or economic policies to make them more uniform with the WTO’s 
economic rules.103  
The WTO does not require its member states to enact and implement the 
same economic policies and laws.104 WTO rules do not address Member 
States’ harmonization of regulations or standards, but rather provides the 
states with rules for international trade.105 Except for tariff concessions, 
WTO Member States are free to legislate, implement, and enforce their 
domestic policies and laws so long as they are compatible with obligations 
under the WTO.106 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), for example, does not require 
WTO Members to introduce specific uniformed SPS standards. Similarly, 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) does not 
provide WTO Members with harmonized technical standards. The WTO 
only requires its Member States to incorporate their commitments and 
agreements under the WTO into their domestic laws in order to implement 
those commitments and agreements. 
  
 99. Report of the Panel, Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon, ¶¶ 3.5-3.7, L/6268 (Mar. 22, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98. 
 100. Id. ¶ 3.7.  
 101. Id. ¶¶ 4.4, 4.7. 
 102. Report of the Panel, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes 
on Cigarettes, ¶¶ 20, 38, 87, DS10/R (Nov. 7, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 
[hereinafter Thailand-Cigarettes]. Requirements of existing legislation to be effective in the 
WTO are to: be legislation in the formal sense; predate the Protocol; and, be mandatory in 
character by its terms or expressed intent. Id. ¶ 83; see also Report of the Panel, Norway-
Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears, ¶ 5.7, L/6474 (June 22, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. 
(36th Supp.) at 306. 
 103. JACKSON 1969, supra note 95, at 295. 
 104. Robertson, supra note 2, at 310-11. 
 105. Jackson 1994, supra note 2, at 600; Ala’i interview, supra note 12. 
 106. Jackson 1994, supra note 2, at 600. 
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WTO rules do not constrain States’ authority to determine and 
implement legitimate environmental policies so long as the policies meet 
WTO obligations of non-discrimination and market access.107 The WTO 
does not preclude its Member States from implementing regulations or taxes 
to curtail domestic pollution and the activities that contribute to pollution.108 
WTO Members can establish health or environmental policies based on 
different values and priorities, as it is difficult to require Member States to 
apply common criteria in their domestic policies in these areas.109 
Constraints under WTO rules are imposed on State’s discriminatory or 
protectionist measures that are taken unilaterally without negotiating with 
other Member States.110 The purpose of non-discrimination obligations 
under the GATT Articles I and III is for national choices on social, political, 
and economic policies not to constrain goods in international trade.111 TBT 
or SPS measures, subsidies,112 or quantity quota113 should be made by 
balancing the desire to avoid distortions in international competition and the 
right to enforce national environmental policies.114 Diversity in regulation 
between different countries is expected under the WTO trading system 
unless international agreements exist that provide a common norm.115  
General exceptions under GATT Article XX116 are interpreted not to 
constrain domestic policy goals for health and environmental protection. 
  
 107. GATT Report 1992, supra note 35, at 5, 7; Bhagwati & Srinivasan 1996, supra 
note 37, at 188-90. 
 108. GATT Report 1992, supra note 35, at 7. 
 109. Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade 
Integration, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? LEGAL 
ANALYSIS, supra note 6 at 21, 34-35. 
 110. GATT Report 1992, supra note 35, at 5-6. 
 111. Mitsuo Matsushita et al., The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and 
Policy 215-16 (2d ed. 2006); Roessler, supra note 109, at 49. 
 112. See GATT 1994, supra note 40, art. XVI. See also Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures art. 22, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. 
 113. Article XI of the GATT 1994 does not allow any trade restrictive measure such 
as quotas, import or export licenses, or other measures other than tariffs or duties. GATT 
Article XI:1 provides:  
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other 
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export 
licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any 
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of 
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of 
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting part. 
GATT 1994, supra note 40, art. XI:1.  
 114. GATT Report 1992, supra note 35, at 8. 
 115. GATT Report 1971, supra note 45, at 4.  
 116. As for environmental measures, paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of GATT Article XX 
are generally invoked. Article XX states:  
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The Panel in Thailand-Cigarette noted that “[GATT Article XX(b)] … 
allow[s] [Member States] to give priorities to human health over trade 
liberalization” as long as trade measures meet the “necessity to” 
requirement under the provision.117 Under GATT Article XX(b), “necessity 
to” is not interpreted in a way that judges the Member State’s justification 
of its environmental policies, but instead examines the trade measures that 
implement the environmental policies.118 The US-Shrimp Appellate Body 
noted that the certification requirement under Section 609 constituted 
“arbitrary discrimination” under the GATT Article XX Chapeau because it 
required exporting countries to adopt the same regulatory program as that in 
the United States without considering the conditions of the exporting 
countries.119 The Panel in EC-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products (hereinafter EC-Asbestos) recognized the non-economic 
character of GATT Article XX as well. It noted that “certain interests may 
take precedence over the rules governing international trade and authorizes 
the adoption of trade measures aimed at preserving these interests while at the 
same time observing certain criteria.”120 Accordingly, GATT Article XX 
respects non-economic considerations of its Member States’ economic 
policies.  
These legal requirements and the DSBs’ decisions under the GATT/WTO 
demonstrate that the purpose of WTO harmonization is not to remove the 
diversity of national value preferences, but to require that national trade 
measures are consistent with WTO rules.121 A State’s value preferences are 
permitted to the extent that they do not threaten the value or reliability of 
  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement 
by any contracting party of measures: . . .  
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; . . .  
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement . . .; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption . . . . (emphasis added).  
GATT 19994, supra note 40, art. XX.  
 117. Thailand-Cigarettes, supra note 102, ¶ 73. 
 118. Roessler, supra note 109, at 34-35.  
 119. US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 42, ¶ 177.  
 120. Panel Report, EC-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
¶ 8.129, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos Panel Report]. 
 121. In this context, the international trade law principle of comparative advantage 
and the international law principle of state sovereignty have the common goal internationally 
of allowing a State to adopt its optimal policies that supports diversity of national policies. 
See Leebron, supra note 11, at 71. 
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the WTO’s commitment to a free and open market.122 If each governmental 
policy goal or value was accepted as an environmental exception to the 
WTO, then the international legal system of trade would be threatened.123 
Accordingly, the WTO harmonization reconciles States’ domestic policies, 
on the one hand, by the WTO recognizing the diversity of policy choices in 
each different society; and, on the other hand, States meeting their value 
preferences for making policy choices in line with the fundamental 
principles of the WTO. 
3.2. A State’s Rights and Contractual Obligations in the WTO 
WTO harmonization requires a Member State to comply with obligations 
under the WTO and parties to a dispute to implement decisions of the WTO 
DSB. This section discusses whether this WTO harmonization requirement 
limits a State’s right to determine and enforce its environmental policies.  
3.2.1. State Sovereignty and Contractual Obligations in 
International Law and the WTO  
3.2.1.1. State Sovereignty and Contractual Obligations 
under International Law 
The international trading system should not interfere with the ability of 
nations to determine or employ measures to achieve environmental goals.124 
In international law, States have the right to determine their own laws and 
policies and what acts are allowed to take place within sovereign territory.125 
International instruments cannot hinder a State from freely pursuing its 
domestic objectives.126 The WTO does not have authority to legally 
challenge national policies.127 A State is only bound to the obligations of the 
  
 122. Hudec 1996b, supra note 6, at 129, 146. 
 123. US-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 6, ¶ 7.45; Rober E. Hudec, Introduction to 2 
FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra 
note 6, at 1, 5.  
 124. Lallas et al, supra note 64, at 271, 335. 
 125. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 277. Regarding territorial jurisdiction, the author 
introduces the concept of “decisional sovereignty” in the Nuclear Test case decision, which 
stated that a State has right “to determine what acts should take place within its territory.” 
See Request For An Examination of the Situation in Accordance With Paragraph 63 of the 
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288 
(Sept. 22); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226 (July 8).  
 126. Bhagwati 1993, supra note 3, at 165-66; Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, 
GATT Legal Restraints on Domestic Environmental Regulations, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND 
HARMONIZATION, supra note 6, at 59, 63. 
 127. ESTY, supra note 2, at 56. 
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specific international treaties to which it agrees.128 In the absence of 
adherence to the WTO agreements, a State is free to deny market access to 
any other State for any reason and to impose trade restrictions 
discriminately.129 In this instance, the State is not bound by the obligations 
of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN), which prohibits discriminatory treatment 
between the same goods from different foreign countries,130 and national 
treatment, which prohibits discriminatory treatment between the same 
domestic and foreign goods,131 and can discriminate against imported 
products.132  
However, when a State agrees to an international instrument, some 
limitations are imposed upon States’ sovereign rights based on the 
agreement.133 Thus, accepting any treaty or trade agreement diminishes the 
freedom of the State to implement domestic policies or take any national 
actions.134 When a State agrees to confer its power to an international 
organization, it agrees to limit its right to exercise the powers conferred to the 
international organization.135 Thus, certain types of actions inconsistent with 
the treaty norms would give rise to an international law violation.136 WTO 
Member States are bound by treaty obligations when they accept and agree 
to WTO agreements.137 The Panel in US-Shrimp noted that “by accepting 
the WTO Agreement, Members commit themselves to certain obligations 
which limit their right to adopt certain measures.”138 WTO Member States 
must comply with basic obligations of MFN, national treatment, non-
quantitative restriction and concession, and obligations under WTO covered 
agreements.139 In summary, a State’s sovereignty, as it relates to its ability 
to make its own domestic policy choices, is constrained to the extent that it 
accepts and agrees to the WTO Agreement.  
  
 128. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 289; Jackson 2008, supra note 17, at 19; Jackson 
2000, supra note 18, at 369. 
 129. Hudec 1996b, supra note 6, at 149. 
 130. GATT 1994, supra note 40, art. I.  
 131. GATT 1994, supra note 40, art. III.  
 132. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 158 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter Jackson 1997]. 
 133. Hudec 1996b, supra note 6, at 149; SAROOSHI, supra note 7, at 1-2. 
 134. Jackson 2000, supra note 18, at 380; Dunleavy, supra note 22, at 268. 
 135. SAROOSHI, supra note 7, at 69. 
 136. Jackson 2000, supra note 18, at 380.  
 137. See generally Hudec 1996b, supra note 6, at 116-17. 
 138. US-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 6, ¶ 7.26. 
 139. The WTO covered agreements include the Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1 and 2, and Plurilateral 
Trade Agreement in Annex 4. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes art. 1, Appendix 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
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3.2.1.2. WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions as 
International Law Obligations  
WTO rules and DSB decisions are binding as international legal 
obligations.140 A dispute settlement body’s ruling can extend the powers 
conferred to an international organization.141 When the WTO DSB rules that 
a Member State is violating WTO rules, it creates an international legal 
obligation requiring that State to change its economic policy, namely the 
inconsistent measure, to make it consistent with WTO rules.142  
However, decisions of WTO dispute settlement bodies enforce the 
existing obligations and do not impose new obligations on Members, nor 
does it inappropriately limit a Member State’s discretion in legislating.143 
Article 3.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) provides that “[r]ecommendations and 
rulings of the DSB cannot add or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements.”144 The dispute settlement mechanism 
is not designed to fill or create new rules or set forth norms in areas the 
WTO does not already, for example, environment or labor standards.145 
Further, the decisions of the DSB are binding only on the States that are 
parties to the dispute.146  
The WTO’s jurisprudence exacerbates the tension between 
internationalism and national sovereignty147 because WTO decisions can 
have important effects in a domestic court’s jurisprudence.148 The Appellate 
Body in US-Shrimp found that the U.S. Court of International Trade’s 
decision allowing the import ban was inconsistent with the GATT Article 
XX Chapeau, and that the import ban should be withdrawn.149 This decision 
holds that State courts must consider international law obligations when 
interpreting national law.150 The decision that rejected the U.S. domestic 
court’s ruling casts a question on the extent to which States can exercise 
their national environmental policies and jurisdiction in the WTO system.  
  
 140. Pauwelyn, supra note 7, at 341; Jackson 1997a, supra note 7, at 63-64.  
 141. SAROOSHI, supra note 7, at 12-13. 
 142. Pauwelyn, supra note 7, at 341; Jackson 1997a, supra note 7, at 60; SAROOSHI, 
supra note 7, at 96-97. 
 143. William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its 
Authority?, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 79, 96 (2001). 
 144. DSU, supra note 139, art. 3.2. 
 145. John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the WTO Emerging Problems, 1 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 329, 347 (1998). 
 146. SAROOSHI, supra note 7, at 70. 
 147. Jackson 2008, supra note 17, at 6-7.  
 148. Jackson 1997a, supra note 7, at 64. 
 149. US-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 6, ¶ 7.56; US-Shrimp Appellate Body 
Report, supra note 42, ¶ 173. 
 150. Jackson 1997a, supra note 7, at 61. 
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Even though States confer their rights to the WTO, the DSB decisions’ 
legal effects and the WTO agreements’ limits on Members’ rights can be 
criticized on the basis that the WTO restricts the sovereign rights of 
Member States to exercise control over their natural resources via export or 
import control.151 The next section examines whether the WTO’s 
multilateral trading system deprives Member States of the right to determine 
appropriate national environmental policies.  
3.2.2. A State’s Right to Determine its Environmental Policies in 
the WTO 
3.2.2.1. WTO Rules on States’ Authority of National 
Environmental Policies  
The WTO recognizes its Member States’ authority to legislate and en-
force their national environmental policies and laws. The national treatment 
obligation under the GATT Article III is interpreted to allow WTO Member 
States to determine legitimate environmental policies unless those environ-
mental policies are taken with protectionist intent.152 The GATT Article XX 
provides a State with the right to regulate and implement its policies on pub-
lic morals, health, and the environment.153 The WTO DSBs’ interpretation 
of measures “necessary to” protect the environment as “least trade restric-
tive” under Article XX(b) is criticized as hindering a State’s sovereign right 
to solve domestic environmental problems.154 Article XX(b), however, al-
lows a State to determine its own environmental policies and the level of 
desirable protection these policies will require.155 With regard to the level of 
protection, the Appellate Body in EC-Asbestos held that within the meaning 
of Article XX(b), “WTO Members have the right to determine the level of 
protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation.”156 
Thus, States may impose environmental requirements on foreign producers 
provided the requirement is for the implementation of an environmental 
policy that meets the requirements of Article XX.157  
The WTO Agreements also recognize its Member States’ choice of 
environmental policies. The Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Establishing 
  
 151. LANG & HINES, supra note 35, at 63-64.  
 152. US-Automobiles, supra note 50, ¶ 5.8. 
 153. Jackson 1997, supra note 132, at 233. 
 154. Schoenbaum, supra note 85, at 277.  
 155. Id. at 285. See also Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Annex A ¶ 5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
 156. Appellate Body Report, EC-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, ¶ 168, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos Appellate Body 
Report].  
 157. Hudec 1996b, supra note 6, at 116-17, 151. 
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Agreement)158 incorporates the concept of sustainable development, which 
was introduced by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) in 1987159 and was firmly established by the 1992 
Rio Declaration.160 The 2001 Ministerial Declaration (Doha Declaration) 
reaffirmed the goal of sustainable development in the WTO161 and 
recognized environmental protection and social development as part of the 
mandate of an economic system.162 Preamble of the WTO Establishing 
Agreement also recognizes that members’ respective needs and concerns 
differ depending on economic development, which affects how each protects 
the environment.163 Thus, the WTO Establishing Agreement recognizes 
WTO Members’ right to take appropriate measures to protect the 
environment.  
The WTO covered agreements also provide Member States with the au-
thority to determine their own policies. For example, Article XIV(b) of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) also allows WTO Member 
  
 158. WTO Establishing Agreement, supra note 85, pmbl. ¶ 1. It provides:  
The Parties to this Agreement, [r]ecognizing that their relations in the 
field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a 
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a 
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and 
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources 
in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking 
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 159. The most commonly referenced form of sustainable development is the definition 
by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED: Brundtland 
Commission). Recognizing the linkage between the environment and economic and social 
issues, the Brundtland Commission recommended “sustainable development” as 
“development that meets the needs of the present and future generations” in 1987. The 
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future 43-46 
(1987). The Brundtland Commission emphasized that development should be maintained in a 
way that balances, reconciles, and integrates economic, environmental, and social priorities. 
Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Markus W. Gehring, Introduction to SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD TRADE LAW 5, 5 (Markus W. Gehring & Marie-Claire Cordonier 
Segger eds., 2005). 
 160. Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration refers to inter-generational equity in the 
Brundtland Commission’s Report. It states that “[t]he right to development must be fulfilled 
so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations.” Rio Declaration, supra note 39, princ. 3. 
 161. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 6, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001), 41 I.L.M.746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].  
 162. Segger & Gehring, supra note 159, at 21.  
 163. WTO Establishing Agreement, supra note 91, prmbl. Paragraph 1 Preamble to the 
WTO Establishing Agreement states that parties recognize they are “seeking both to protect 
and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent 
with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.” 
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States to adopt or enforce measures “necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health.”164 Similarly, the SPS Agreement recognizes a State’s 
discretion to determine its own appropriate health policies by incorporating 
the notion of the precautionary principle as an exception to risk assessment 
and international standards requirements. Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement 
allows States to take precautionary measures in the absence of sufficient 
scientific evidence, rather than waiting for a time when the risk assessment 
requirement can be met.165 The precautionary principle provides that States 
should not allow the absence of full scientific certainty to prevent them 
from enacting measures to protect the environment.166 The precautionary 
principle grants States discretion in their policy making to act in order to 
prevent any harm to human health or the environment.167 Article 3.3 of the 
SPS Agreement also allows Members to adopt appropriate domestic policies 
to protect the environment with standards that are higher than international 
standards.168 The Appellate Body in European Communities-Measures Con-
cerning Meat and Meat Products (hereinafter EC-Hormones) recognized the 
precautionary principle is reflected in Articles 5.7 and 3.3 and paragraph six 
of the Preamble of the SPS Agreement.169 These provisions give WTO 
Members the discretion to determine their own optimal policies for human 
health and environmental protection.  
  
 164. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV(b), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 
[hereinafter GATS]. Article XIV(b) of the GATS provides: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
Member of measures . . . necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health.  
Id. 
 165. SPS Agreement, supra note 155, art. 5.7. 
 166. Winspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle of January 26, 1998, The 
Wingspread Consensus Statement on the Precautionary Principle, available at 
http://www.sehn.org/wing.html (Dec. 22, 2008). 
 167. James Cameron, The Precautionary Principle, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
MILLENNIUM 287, 288 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 2d ed. 2002); David 
Freestone & Ellen Hey, Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle, in THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 
3, 13 (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996); Hunter et al., INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 511 (3rd ed. 2007) (1998); Ellen Hey, The Precautionary 
Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEO. INT’L. L. REV. 
303, 307 (1992) (broadly defining the precautionary principle as a “policy-making  
strategy . . . address[ing] the manner in which policy-makers, for purposes of protecting the 
environment, apply science, technology, and economics.”). 
 168. SPS Agreement, supra note 155, art. 3.3. 
 169. Appellate Body Report, EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶ 124, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
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The TBT Agreement also permits WTO Members to adopt the 
appropriate technical regulations to fulfill a legitimate governmental 
objective related to their environmental policies. The Preamble of the TBT 
Agreement, provides that “no country should be prevented from taking 
measures . . . for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of 
the environment.”170 Under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, a Member 
State can adopt a technical regulation to “fulfill a legitimate objective” of 
the environment.171 Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement permits Member 
States to adopt and use national standards for technical standards when 
international standards are absent.172 The Appellate Body in European 
Communities-Trade Description of Sardines noted that the TBT Agreement 
acknowledged the right of WTO members to establish the objectives of their 
technical regulations.173  
The GATT and the WTO have granted members the right to choose their 
own economic system and trade policies,174 but they have not allowed 
  
 170. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade preamble ¶ 6, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 
U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
 171. Id. art. 2.2. Article 2.2 provides: 
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, 
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, 
technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks 
non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter 
alia: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive 
practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or 
health, or the environment.  
Id. 
 172. Id. art. 2.4. It says:  
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international 
standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use 
them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical 
regulations except when such international standards or relevant 
parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the 
fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because 
of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental 
technological problems.  
Id.  
 173. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 
276, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002). 
 174. Panel Report, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, 
L/833 (Oct. 23, 1958), GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60 (Italy extend favorable credit to 
purchasers of Italian-made tractors and the UK brought action alleging violation of national 
treatment provision in Article III:4, the Panel found that the GATT does not limit the right of 
a member State to adopt measures that appeared necessary to it to foster its economic 
development or to protect a domestic industry, provided that such measures were permitted 
by the GATT). 
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members’ measures when they are arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminate, or 
are a disguised restriction on international trade. While GATT Article XX 
provides Member States with justification for trade measures necessary to 
or relating to environmental protection, such measures must not constitute 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” nor “a disguised restriction on 
international trade” under the Chapeau of GATT Article XX. Those 
principles of non-discrimination or a non- disguised restriction are also 
embodied in the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement, and the GATS.175 
Doha Declaration also noted that Members’ measures should not constitute 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or “a disguised restriction on 
international trade,” and that those measures should be in accordance with 
the WTO agreements.176 In addition to these non-discrimination and non-
protectionism principles, a Member State must meet requirements under 
each covered agreement to justify its trade measures.  
These provisional devices impose a certain degree of constraint on WTO 
Member States’ ability to exercise their rights to defend other Member 
States’ market-access rights. The purpose of the GATT 1994 and WTO 
covered agreements is not to guarantee that Members use the domestic 
policies of specific technical regulations, SPS measures, subsidies, anti-
dumping duties, or countervailing duties, but rather to ensure that these 
domestic policies do not undermine market access rights.177 This implies 
that if the WTO decides to include an Environment Agreement as one of its 
covered agreements, then the WTO Environment Agreement would regulate 
environmental measures, not to hinder international trade, but rather to 
provide a framework for environmental protection in international trade. 
In sum, the WTO gives Member States discretion to choose and enforce 
their optimal environmental policies, though with some limitations based on 
contractual obligations and legitimate requirements under the GATT 1994 
and the WTO agreements.  
3.2.2.2. WTO Jurisprudence on States’ Authority of 
National Environmental Policies  
The GATT/WTO dispute settlement bodies have recognized its Member 
States’ discretion to adopt and implement their own environmental policies. 
Many GATT/WTO decisions have supported States’ authority of national 
environmental policies using different expression. For example, both Panels 
of the US-Tuna (Mexico) and US-Tuna (EEC) noted that a State has right to 
implement national policies in pursuant to environmental protection goals. 
  
 175. See SPS Agreement, supra note155, prmbl ¶ 1, arts. 2(3), 5(5); TBT Agreement, 
supra note 170, pmbl ¶ 6; GATS, supra note 164, art. XIV(b). 
 176. Doha Declaration, supra note 161, ¶ 6.  
 177. See Roessler, supra note 109, at 42, 52; see also Debra P. Steger, The Culture of 
the WTO: Why It Needs to Change, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 483, 491-92 (2007).  
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The US-Tuna (Mexico) and US-Tuna (EEC) Panels noted that their 
decisions were based on the “consideration that [they] would affect neither 
the rights of individual [Member States] to pursue their internal 
environmental policies and to cooperate with one another in harmonizing 
such policies, nor the right of [Member States] acting jointly to address 
international environmental problems.”178 Further, the US-Tuna (Mexico) 
Panel concluded that a State is “free to tax or regulate imported products . . . 
for environmental purposes” unless its taxes and regulations discriminate 
against imported products or afford protection to domestic products.179 Here 
the US-Tuna (Mexico) Panel emphasized that non-discriminatory and non-
protectionist policies are legitimate for environmental protection.  
In United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 
(hereinafter US-Gasoline), the Panel and Appellate Body stressed the 
balance States environmental policy goals and WTO rules. The Panel of 
US-Gasoline concluded “WTO Members were free to set their own 
environmental objectives, but they were bound to implement these 
objectives through measures consistent with [WTO rules].”180 The US-
Gasoline Appellate Body also noted in its concluding remarks that “WTO 
Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies 
on the environment . . . , their environmental objectives and the 
environmental legislation they enact and implement. . . . [T]hat autonomy is 
circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements of [the GATT] 
and other covered agreements.”181 The US-Gasoline decisions stressed that 
so long as Member States complied with obligations of the GATT 1994 and 
WTO covered agreements, States could exercise their environmental 
autonomy.  
The US-Shrimp Panel highlighted the importance of securing the 
multilateral trading system in determining national environmental policies. 
The US-Shrimp Panel emphasized that under the WTO, Member States have 
“the right . . . to implement the environmental policies of their choice 
through trade measures, as long as those trade measures do not affect the 
multilateral system to the point where the WTO Agreement is deprived of 
its object and purpose.”182 The US-Shrimp Panel noted, in its concluding 
remarks, that “Members are free to set their own environmental objectives. 
However, they are bound to implement these objectives in such a way that 
is consistent with their WTO obligations, not depriving the WTO 
Agreement of its object and purpose.”183 Thus, the US-Shrimp Appellate 
Body, similar to US-Gasoline Appellate Body, recognized that States can 
  
 178. US-Tuna (Mexico), supra note 41, ¶ 6.4; see also US-Tuna (EEC), supra note 
41, ¶¶ 5.26, 5.37-5.38. 
 179. US-Tuna (Mexico), supra note 41, ¶ 6.2. 
 180. US-Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 50, ¶ 7.1. 
 181. US-Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 50, at 30. 
 182. US-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 6, ¶ 6.6; see also id. ¶¶ 7.45, 7.55, 9.1. 
 183. Id. ¶ 9.1.  
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adopt their own policies to protect the environment provided that they 
“fulfill their obligations and respect the rights of other Members under the 
WTO Agreement.”184  
Several decisions supported that GATT Article XX grants States right to 
determine environmental policies in pursuant to the appropriate level of 
protection in each country. The EC-Asbestos Panel noted that the “necessary 
to protect” requirement under GATT Article XX(b) does not imply a 
restriction on Members’ “freedom . . . to take certain measures rather than 
others.”185 The EC-Asbestos Appellate Body also recognized WTO 
Members’ rights to determine the appropriate level of protection under 
GATT Article XX(b).186 In Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres (hereinafter Brazil-Tyres), where Brazil invoked Article XX(b) to 
justify its ban on imports of retreaded tires, the Panel recalled the EC-
Asbestos Appellate Body’ position, noting that “every WTO Member has the 
‘right to determine a level of protection of health that [it considers] 
appropriate in a given situation’” within the meaning of [GATT] Article 
XX(b).187 The Brazil-Tyres Appellate Body also, in determining measures 
necessary to protect under GATT Article XX(b), observed that “it is within 
the authority of a WTO Member to set the public health or environmental 
objectives it seeks to achieve, as well as the level of protection that it wants 
to obtain, through the measure or the policy it chooses to adopt.”188 The 
Appellate Body recognized that it is a fundamental principle that “WTO 
members have the right to determine the level of protection they consider 
appropriate” within the meaning of GATT Article XX(b).189 The Panel in 
United States-Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products [hereinafter US-Tuna Labeling] also followed 
previous decisions by recognizing that WTO members have the “right to 
determine the legitimate policies they want to pursue.”190 
In summary, the goals of the WTO Member States’ environmental 
policies are considered legitimate as long as they fulfill their obligations and 
respect other Members’ rights under the GATT 1994 and WTO covered 
agreements, comply with the fundamental international trade principles of 
non-discrimination and non-protectionism, and secure the object and 
purpose of the multilateral trading system.191 When measures meet these 
  
 184. US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 42, ¶ 186. 
 185. EC-Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 120, ¶ 8.183.  
 186. EC-Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 168.  
 187. Brazil-Tyres Panel Report, supra note 50, ¶ 5.3. 
 188. Brazil-Tyres Appellate Body Report, supra note 51, ¶ 140. 
 189. Id. ¶ 210. 
 190. Panel Report, United States-Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and 
Sale of Tuna and Tuan Products, ¶¶ 7.441, 7.622, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter 
US-Tuna Labeling Panel Report]. 
 191. US-Tuna (Mexico), supra note 41, ¶ 6.2; US Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 
50, ¶ 7.1; US Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 50, at 30; US-Shrimp Panel Report, 
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requirements, they are recognized as “necessary to” or “relating to” achieve 
an environmental policy objective.  
3.3. WTO’s Limited Adjudication to Judge National Environmental 
Necessity  
Under the state sovereignty principle, the WTO cannot interfere with a 
State’s authority to determine and enforce its national environmental policies 
and laws within its jurisdiction. Member states of the WTO are constrained 
only in the application of their national policies and laws to the extent 
necessary to comply with their obligations under the WTO. Here, the 
application of national policies must be distinguished from the legislation or 
enforcement authority of such policies. While constraining the application of 
national policies and law to not violate WTO rules is acceptable, interfering 
with national capacity to legislate or enforce policies through the use of WTO 
rules or a DSBs’ decision is not acceptable under the state sovereignty 
principle. Accordingly, even though some limitations are imposed on a State’s 
application of its environmental polices and law, WTO rules and DSBs’ 
decisions demonstrate that WTO Members possess autonomy to determine, 
legislate, and enforce their environmental policies and laws to the extent 
that they are legitimate under the WTO economic rules.  
The WTO has limited authority to adjudicate national policy choices and 
enforcement. Neither the WTO itself nor its DSBs have the power to 
enforce WTO rules or DSBs’ decisions in WTO Member States.192 
Compliance with WTO obligations or DSBs’ decisions depends on the 
willingness of Member States or dispute parties to do so. The WTO DSBs, 
unlike domestic tribunals, cannot enforce their ruling by imposing 
punishment or fines on parties to the dispute. They only judge whether 
measures at issue in the dispute are consistent or inconsistent with WTO 
rules. The method of resolution depends on the parties to the dispute. A 
certain Member State would have to be “willing to bear the cost of 
measured retaliation” by injured Member States or withdraw from WTO 
covered agreements.193  
WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies cannot judge a country’s political 
values or the factors it considers to determine what policies are necessary 
based on the degree of serious environmental harm.194 The Panel in US-
  
supra note 6, ¶¶ 6.6, 7.45, 7.55, 9.1; US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 42, ¶ 186; 
Brazil-Tyres Panel Report, supra note 50, ¶ 210. 
 192. STEGER, supra note 177, at 485-86. Professor Steger notes that “the WTO is 
driven solely by its members acting collectively. . . . The members will not allow the 
Director-General to have any real power, nor will they delegate any significant policy setting 
. . . .”; see also Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the 
GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 279 (1991).  
 193. Sykes, supra note 191, at 277, 279, 285. 
 194. Hudec 1996b, supra note 6, at 150; Murase 1999, supra note 34, at 421-24. 
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Gasoline noted that the task of the Panel was to examine whether “the 
aspect of the Gasoline Rule found inconsistent with [the GATT] was 
necessary to achieve the stated policy objectives under Article XX(b),” but 
it was “not the task of the Panel to examine the necessity of the 
environmental objectives of the Gasoline Rule . . . that the Panel did not 
specifically find to be inconsistent with [the GATT 1994].”195 The Panel 
emphasized “[it was not its task] to examine generally the desirability or 
necessity of the environmental objectives of the Clean Air Act or the 
Gasoline Rule. Its examination was confined to those aspects of the 
Gasoline Rule that had been raised by the complainants under specific 
provisions of the [GATT 1994].”196 The Brazil-Tyres Panel recalled US-
Gasoline Panel’s position, noting the “[WTO Panel is not] required to 
examine the desirability of the declared policy goal as such” and, thus, 
“[does not have] to assess the policy choice by Brazil to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health.”197 Similarly, the US-Tuna Labeling Panel 
noted the Panel does not determine “what might be an appropriate level of 
protection to achieve in relation to the objectives identified by the United 
States for the information of consumers and the protection of dolphins in 
relation to the manner in which tuna is caught.”198 These decisions 
demonstrate that WTO DSBs do not have authority to assess environmental 
objectives of national policies.  
The WTO has neither the capability nor the mandate to develop 
environmental performance standards.199 Further, the WTO has no explicit 
provision regarding environmental protection, conservation or 
preservation.200 Thus, given the lack of substantive rules governing the 
relationship between trade and the environment, it is inevitable that the 
WTO DSBs would refuse to decide a case in which it has to do so based on 
the merits of an environmental policy itself.201 The WTO DSBs only rule on 
whether the measure at issue is taken in accordance with obligations and 
requirements under the WTO.  
SUMMARY  
Both the State and WTO harmonization requirements must be 
implemented in a way that protects States’ right of environmental policy 
choice and enforcement. The State harmonization requirement, which 
restricts trade unless another State accepts its environmental policy, has the 
potential to infringe on another State’s right to determine and enforce its 
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own environmental policy. One State’s right to take measures must be 
balanced with another State’s right to choose national policies under the 
state sovereignty principle of international law. States’ autonomy must be 
respected and thus policy choices that infringe on other States are not 
allowed to balance each State’s rights. If the State harmonization 
requirement is based on common concern for environmental protection, 
then it can reach a balance with other States’ autonomy through 
international cooperation. The WTO encourages balance between a State’s 
rights and obligations. Because the WTO’s function is to secure its system 
by providing freedom of trade for its Member States, the WTO’s balancing 
requirement may constrain one State’s right on a certain level to protect 
other States’ rights. 
WTO harmonization, requiring compliance with obligations under WTO 
rules and the rulings of WTO DSBs, must consider the diversity of States’ 
value preferences and the authority of States to make their own policy 
choices. The WTO cannot judge a State’s choice of policy, but it can judge 
a State’s application of that policy. The WTO only judges whether a State’s 
application of its laws and policies is within the WTO rules. In this context, 
the WTO requires a balance between a State’s desire to avoid distortion in 
international competition and another State’s right to enforce environmental 
policies. The WTO cannot judge whether a State’s exercise of right 
infringes on another’s right. Rather, the WTO judges whether a State’s 
exercise of rights violates any obligations or concessions under the GATT 
1994 and the WTO covered agreement to protect other States’ rights to 
trade freely within the WTO system. 
Further, even though a State is not allowed to infringe on another’s 
sovereignty under the international law, when it occurs, it becomes a more 
political than legal issue. This is because the infringing State takes the 
action despite the fact it knows that it is illegal. International instruments 
such as the WTO or International Court of Justice (ICJ) may make legal 
decisions, but they cannot enforce their rulings on the countries nor punish 
such infringing States.  
The modern state sovereignty principle recognizes that a State is more 
influenced by other States’ actions or international institutions’ activities 
due to increased interdependence caused by globalization. A State’s rights 
also are constrained to the extent that a State consents to be bound by 
treaties or international law. However, these constraints on State’s rights do 
not overwhelm state sovereignty because international constraints require a 
State’s agreement. Accordingly, either the State or WTO harmonization 
must be implemented to respect a State’s sovereign right to make its own 
environmental or economic policy choices.    
 
